War and the evolution of belligerence and bravery. by Lehmann, L. & Feldman, M.W.
War and the evolution of belligerence and bravery
Laurent Lehmann* and Marcus W. Feldman
Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA
Tribal war occurs when a coalition of individuals use force to seize reproduction-enhancing resources, and
it may have affected human evolution. Here, we develop a population-genetic model for the coevolution of
costly male belligerence and bravery when war occurs between groups of individuals in a spatially
subdivided population. Belligerence is assumed to increase an actor’s group probability of trying to
conquer another group. An actor’s bravery is assumed to increase his group’s ability to conquer an attacked
group.We show that the selective pressure on these two traits can be substantial even in groups of large size,
and that they may be driven by two independent reproduction-enhancing resources: additional mates for
males and additional territory (or material resources) for females. This has consequences for our
understanding of the evolution of intertribal interactions, as hunter-gatherer societies are well known to
have frequently raided neighbouring groups from whom they appropriated territory, goods and women.
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Courage, above all things, is the first quality of a warrior.
(von Clausewitz 1832)
1. INTRODUCTION
War is costly in lives and resources, but has been a recurrent
event throughout human history. There are two major
classes of explanations for the existence of war (Fearon
1995). The first is irrationality: individuals within groups or
states are controlled by leaders subject to pathological biases
leading them to ignore the costs of war. The second is
rationality, i.e. war occurs if its benefits to the group or the
state exceed its costs. In the rational case, economists and
political scientists often consider interstate or civil wars as a
bargaining process. The reason for initiating the conflict is
then to induce the other side tomake an acceptable offer for
the distribution of some resources among the disputants, in
the presence of incomplete information about their power or
inability to comply to a deal (e.g. Fearon 1995; Slantchev &
Leventoglu 2007). Evolutionists have stressed that repro-
duction-enhancing resources (those that increase the
survival or the fertility of individuals), which can be
obtained by coercion, may have played a crucial role in
human evolution (e.g. Durham 1976; Tooby & Cosmides
1988; Turchin 2003; Richerson & Boyd 2005).
War is an aggressive interaction between groups of
individuals, and it would not be possible if the groups were
unable to form cohesive units of cooperating individuals.
Within-group cooperation is the basis of between-group
conflict (Turchin 2003). Sun Tzu was perhaps the first to
make this point by emphasizing that one of the most
important covenants whichmust be fulfilled when going to
war is the ‘The Moral Law’, which exhorts individuals
within groups to be in complete accordance with their
ruler, so that they will follow him, altruistically, regardless
of their lives (Sun-Tzu sixth century BC). Pre-state
societies are characterized by small group size and limited
gene flow between groups, which leads to significant
genetic relatedness between members of the same group, a
necessary condition for genetically based altruism to
evolve (Hamilton 1970, 1971, 1975). Hamilton (1975)
further speculated that high relatedness within groups,
coupled with the development of language allowing
for sophisticated collective action, would result in the
development of cohesive solidarity within groups (i.e.
helping behaviours) and explosive hostility between groups.
In this paper, we investigate Hamilton’s scenario with a
population-genetic model of war between groups in a
saturated environment (i.e. the population is at its carrying
capacity), in an attempt to quantify analytically the selective
pressure on within-group coalition and between-group
hostility. To this end, we assume that males, who are almost
always the warriors in humans and higher primates, express
two individually costly traits. The first trait causes an actor
to be belligerent, which increases the probability that the
actor’s group goes to war and tries to conquer another
group. The second trait causes an actor to be brave, which
increases the probability that its group wins a war and
conquers another group. We investigate the coevolutionary
dynamics of male belligerence and bravery in response to
two independent types of reproduction-enhancing
resources that can be sequestered by conquest: additional
mates for males (at the expense of the opposing males) and
additional territory (or material resources) for females (at
the expense of the females in the opposing group).
Our model of warfare between small-sized, pre-state
groups of individuals is not the first: Choi & Bowles (2007)
used simulations to analyse this problem. They did not
analyse the roles of life-history features such as group size
and migration rates, which are well known to affect the
evolutionary dynamics of genetically determined social
traits in subdivided populations (Hamilton 1975; Cherry &
Wakeley 2003; Whitlock 2003; Rousset 2004; Lion &
Van Baalen 2007; West et al. 2008). The analytical model
presented here allows us to investigate how such features
shape the evolution of male belligerence and bravery. Our
model also supposes that individuals are diploid and
that there are two sexes, which allows us to show that
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male coalitional aggression can be an adaptation to the
conditions of limiting resources for both sexes.
2. MODEL
(a) Life cycle
We consider a population consisting of an infinite number
of groups, each with a finite numberNm of adult males and
Nf of adult females. Groups are connected by random
migration (Wright’s 1931; infinite-island model of dis-
persal) and warfare occurs between groups. Events in the
life cycle occur in the following order. (i) Adult mated
females in each group produce a large number of juveniles.
Juvenilesmature and become subadults (pre-reproductive).
(ii) Each subadult disperses independently of the others to a
new randomly chosen group. Males disperse with prob-
ability mm, while females disperse with probability m f. All
adult individuals die. (iii) War occurs between groups.With
probability a, the subadult males in each group try to
conquer another random group. This results in a battle
between pairs of opposing groups: the attacker and the
attacked groups, where the attacker wins the battle with
probability u. If the attacker group wins the battle, we call
the attacked group conquered. If the attacker group loses the
battle, it retreats. (iv) Density-dependent competition
occurs in each group between individuals of the same sex,
and exactly Nm males and Nf females reach adulthood in
each group. In non-conquered groups, only subadults from
that group compete against each other. In conquered
groups, subadults from both the conqueror and conquered
group compete against each other, and with probability si ;
an individual of sex i randomly sampled from a conquered
group after competition is a member from that group before
competition. (v) In each group (conquered or not), the Nm
males mate randomly with the Nf females.
If si!1, the conquered groups are partially repopulated
by individuals from the conqueror group and 1Ksi
represents the fraction of the individuals of sex i of the
conquered groups that are replaced by the individuals of
sex i from the conqueror group. In order to have low values
of si (high fitness benefit for conquerors), one could, for
example, assume that with probability ki an individual
of sex i in a conquered group is killed after conquest, in
which case siZ ð1K kiÞ=ð1K kiC1Þ, or that individuals
from the conquered groups are more likely to die
from resource exhaustion. The probability si could
also be determined by a negotiation between the
combatant parties.
In order to determine whether between-group belliger-
ence and within-group bravery will spread (whether a andu
evolve), we introduce a two-locus (two-trait) model with
additive geneaction,withonly twoalleles segregatingat each
locus.Wemeasure fitness in units ofmated females. That is,
fitness is defined as the expected number of adult mated
females produced, through sons and daughters, by adult
mated males and females (e.g. Taylor 1988b, 1992). The
first locus controls the expression of belligerence, which
causes its bearer to express hostility towards other groups by
affecting the probability that the actor’s group tries to
conquer another group. We assume that the probability a,
that a group attacks another group depends on the average
phenotype of pre-adult males in that group, where the
phenotype of each pre-adult male is itself determined by the
genotype of its father. We thus postulate paternal control of
the phenotypes of offspring. This assumption is introduced
for mathematical convenience. An adult male bearing a
single copy of a mutant ‘belligerence’ allele produces sons
that increment thenet probability that a groupgoes towarby
Ba/(2Nm) relative to that of homozygotes for the resident
(wild-type) allele in an adult male. We also assume that
belligerence is costly (in terms of time or energy) and that it
reduces the chance that a pre-adult survives density-
dependent competition. We assume that bearing a single
copy of themutant belligerence allele decreases the fitness of
an adult male by Ca/2 units.
The second locus controls the expression of bravery of
pre-adult males during warfare, which is again assumed to
be under parental control. An adult male bearing a single
copy of a mutant ‘bravery’ allele produces sons that
increment the net probability that a group wins a war by
Bu /(2Nm), relative to that of homozygotes for the resident
(wild-type) allele in an adult male. Bravery is also assumed
to be costly (in terms of risk of injury or death) and bearing
a single copy of the mutant bravery allele decreases the
fitness of an adult male by Cu/2 units, whenever a battle
occurs. Individuals bearing two copies of the resident
allele benefit from the expression of bravery by other males
but do not pay the cost.
(b) Change in gene frequency
The change in gene frequency induced by selection will
depend on the covariances of genes within individuals
(linkage disequilibrium) and between individuals within
groups (relatedness). The dynamics of these two types of
genetic associations will in turn depend on the strength of
selection. For analytical tractability, however, we will
neglect the effect of selection on genetic associations by
evaluating the change in gene frequency under weak
selection only. With this assumption, the change in the
frequency of a mutant allele is computed to the first order
in a parameter d describing the strength of selection, which
can be thought of as the largest of the four phenotypic
effects on fitness (Ca, Cu, Ba and Bu). Any effect of
selection on genetic associations (of order d or higher) can
then be neglected because this will produce changes in the
gene frequencies to the second and higher order in d.
Consequently, it is sufficient to compute genetic associ-
ations under neutrality, which implies that the linkage
disequilibrium will be zero at equilibrium but relatedness
will build up (Roze & Rousset 2005, 2008). For this
reason, we ascertain the direction of selection at a locus by
assuming that there is no current polymorphism at the
other locus (i.e. separation of time scale). Under weak
selection, the change in the frequency p over one iteration
of the life cycle of a mutant allele (either the belligerence
or the bravery allele) can then be expressed as
DpZ pð1KpÞS; ð2:1Þ
where the selection coefficient S on the mutant allele is
frequency independent (Rousset 2004, pp. 108–109 and
pp. 206–207). The selection coefficient S can be computed
as an inclusive fitness effect, which is a relatedness-
weighted sum of the changes in the fitness of a focal
individual bearing themutant allele due to the expressionof
the mutation by him and other actors in the population
(Hamilton 1964, 1970). Since we have postulated an
infinite-island model of dispersal, the relatedness between
individuals from different groups is zero. We need only to
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evaluate the changes in the fitness of a focal individual,
resulting from the behaviours of all individuals in the
focal group,who carry copies of themutant allele which are
identical by descent (including the effect of the focal
individual on itself ). For simplicity, we also assume that the
migration rate and the number of adult individuals of each
sex is the same (NmZNfZN, mmZmfZm).
(c) Inclusive fitness effect
In order to evaluate S explicitly, we need four distinct
quantities (e.g. Taylor 1990; Taylor & Frank 1996; Frank
1998; Rousset 2004). First, we must evaluate how carrying
themutation changes the fitness of a focal matedmale and a
focal mated female through their effects on sons and
daughters. Second, we need to weight the changes in the
fitness of a focal adult of sex j by the frequency tij of the
transmission of its genes to offspring of sex i (i, jZm,f ).
Third,weneed toweight the changes infitness tooffspringof
sex i by the reproductive value ni of the individuals of sex i
(i.e. the class reproductive value of sex i; but because we
evaluate fitness in terms of mated individuals, the distri-
bution of class reproductive values at that stage is actually
proportional to the distribution of individual reproductive
values, since thenumberofmated individuals of both sexes is
equal on average). Since all individuals are diploid, we have
t ijZ1/2 for all i and j, which implies that the reproductive
values of all males and females are the same (nmZnfZ1/2).
Fourth, we need to weight the changes in fitness by the
probabilities of identity by descent between homologous
genes sampled within and between the classes of actors
affecting the fitness of the focal individual: this measures the
extent to which group members are likely to increment or
decrement thefitness of the focal individual relative to thatof
an individual not carrying the mutation. To this end, we
define Qw as the probability (varying between 1/2 and 1) of
identity bydescent between two homologous genes sampled
randomly with replacement from the same individual, and
which is the same for both sexes (i.e. co-ancestry with self;
see equation (A 4) of appendix). We denote by Qij the
probability of identity by descent between a gene sampled in
an adult of sex i and another homologous gene randomly
sampled from a distinct adult of sex j from the same group
(i.e. identity evaluated after dispersal). Finally, we define
QRmmZ ð1=NÞQwC ð1K1=NÞQmm, as the probability of
identity between two genes randomly sampled with
replacement from the same group (because we assumed
paternal controlQRff never appears).
In order to evaluate the changes in fitness, we first
derive the fitness of an individual from a focal group in a
monomorphic population, i.e. in a population fixed for
either the mutant or the wild-type allele. This entails that a
and u are the same for all groups in the population, and if
uO1/2, there is an advantage to attacking (offensive
advantage). Owing to our assumption of constant
population size, fitness must be equal to one, and it
depends on four events. First, the focal group is not
attacked (probability 1Ka), in which case both males and
females obtain one unit of fitness by reproducing in the
focal group. Second, the focal group is attacked and wins
the battle (probability a(1Ku)), in which case both males
and females obtain one unit of fitness by reproducing in
the focal group. Third, the focal group is attacked but loses
the battle (probability au), in which case males obtain sm
units of fitness and females obtain sf units of fitness by
reproducing in the focal group. Fourth, the focal group
attacks another group and wins the battle (probability au),
in which case a male and a female from the focal group
obtain, respectively, 1Ksm and 1Ksf units of fitness by
reproducing in the conquered group. Summing up all
fitness components, we have
1KauCausiCauð1K siÞZ 1: ð2:2Þ
In the next two sections, we evaluate how this fitness is
altered by the behaviour of the focal individual (bearing at
least one copy of a mutant allele) and its group members,
assuming that the effects on fitness are small. Expressing
the belligerence allele will alter a while expressing the
bravery allele will alter u. For ease of presentation, we
proceed in a rather heuristic way (e.g. Taylor 1988b, 1992;
Taylor & Irwin 2000), but the following calculations can
be validated more rigorously by writing down the fitness
functions corresponding to the life cycle (e.g. Taylor &
Frank 1996; Rousset 2004).
(d) Male belligerence
By producing belligerent sons, a focal male decreases
directly his fitness byCaQw, whereQw gives the probability
that the focal male produces belligerent sons. Since a
belligerent son has a lower chance of surviving density-
dependent competition (stage 4 of the life cycle), his
behaviour decreases the intensity of competition among
males in his group. This implies that by remaining in his
natal group (philopatry) a belligerent son increases the
chances that his philopatric brothers find an empty spot,
which indirectly increases the fitness of the focal male.
Similarly, when adult males in the focal group produce
belligerent sons, the intensity of competition for the focal
male’s offspring remaining philopatric decreases, which
indirectly increases the focal individual’s fitness. The net
indirect increase in the focal male’s fitness due to all adult
males in the focal group carrying the mutation, and
concomitantly reducing the intensity of competition,
depends on three events. First, the focal group is
not attacked or it is attacked but it wins the battle
(probability 1Kau), in which case the focal male gains
indirectlyCað1KmÞ2QRmm units of fitness, where (1Km)2 is
the probability that two philopatric males compete against
each other (since neither migrated) andQRmm measures the
probability that males from the focal group express a gene
identical by descent to that of a focal gene in the focal
male and thus produce belligerent males. Second, the
focal group is attacked but loses the battle (probability
au), in which case the focal’s male indirect fitness gain is
Cuð1KmÞ2s2mQRmm, where ð1KmÞ2s2m is the probability
that two philopatric males from the focal group compete
against the other in this case. Finally, the focal group
attacks another group and wins the battle (probabi-
lity au), in which case the focal male indirectly
gains Cuð1KmÞ2ð1K smÞ2QRmm units of fitness. Summing
up all components weighted by their probabilities of
occurrence, we find that carrying the belligerence allele
indirectly increases the fitness of the focal male by
Cað1KmÞ2ð1K2ausmð1K smÞÞQRmm.
By producing belligerent sons, the focal male also
increases the probability that his son’s group goes to war
(effect on a of the last term on the left-hand side of
equation (2.2)). Since the number of pre-adult males is
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assumed to be very large, we assume that the effect of a
single pre-adult male on the probability that his group goes
to war is negligible. This entails that we ignore the change
in fitness to the focal male due to belligerent sons
dispersing, but we take into account the effect of those
remaining philopatric because they constitute a fraction
(1Km)/N of the focal group’s males after dispersal. The
net increase in the probability that the focal group goes to
war due to all males in the focal group carrying the
belligerence allele is aBað1KmÞQRmm. If the war is won,
(probability u) the focal male’s fitness through sons
increases by (1Ksm) and through daughters by (1Ksf).
So far, we have calculated the fitness costs and benefits
that accrue to a mated focal male bearing at least one copy
of the mutant allele. But we must also take into account the
fitness costs and benefits that accrue to a mated female
bearing at least one copy of the mutant allele. This is
obtained by weighting all the gains and losses of fitness
calculated for the focal male byQfm instead ofQw andQ
R
mm.
The coefficient Qfm is the probability of identity by descent
between a gene sampled in the focal female and a
homologous gene sampled in her mate who controls the
phenotype of her offspring. The overall accounting of
fitness change is provided in the first four rows of table 1.
(e) Male bravery
By producing brave sons, a focal male directly decreases
his fitness by CuQw when the focal group is attacked and
wins the war. Since bravery increases the risk that the sons
of the focal male die, the number of competing males in
the focal group decreases, which translates into a higher
chance that neighbours find an empty spot during density-
dependent competition (stage 4 of the life cycle).
The indirect increase in the focal male’s fitness due to
all adults males in the focal group producing brave
sons, when the focal group is attacked and wins the war,
is Cuð1KmÞ2QRmm. The loss in fitness for a focal male
producing brave male offspring when the focal group is
attacked but loses the war is CusmQw, while his indirect
fitness benefit isCuð1KmÞ2s2mQRmm. Finally, when the focal
group attacks another group and wins the battle, the focal
male loses Cuð1K smÞQw units of fitness in the conquered
group and indirectly gains Cuð1KmÞ2ð1K smÞ2QRmm units
of fitness. Summing up all components, we find that
carrying the mutation directly decreases the fitness of the




A focal male producing brave offspring also increases
the probability that the male’s group wins the war,
whenever that group is attacked or it attacks another
group, or both. As we did in the case of male belligerence,
we assume that the effect of a single pre-adult male on the
probability that its group wins a battle is vanishingly small.
Hence, we ignore the gain in fitness due to the effect of
bravery of dispersing males but take into account the effect
of those remaining philopatric. The increase in mating
success for the focal male’s sons due to all males in the
focal group expressing bravery, and thus increasing the
chance that the focal group wins a battle, is
2auBuð1KmÞð1K smÞQRmm, which is obtained as follows.
With probability (1Km), the focal male’s son remains
philopatric and two events might occur. First, the focal
group is attacked by another group, in which case the
expression of bravery decreases the probability that the
attacker group wins the battle (i.e. negative perturbation
of u in the middle term of the left-hand side of equation
(2.2)). Second, the focal group tries to conquer another
group, in which case the expression of bravery increases
the probability that the focal group wins the battle (i.e.
positive perturbation of u in the last term of the left-hand
side of equation (2.2)). For both events, the focal male
obtains (1Ksm) units of fitness through sons and (1Ksf)
units of fitness through daughters. As before, we must also
take into account the fitness costs and benefits that accrue
to a mated focal female bearing at least one copy of the
mutant allele, and the overall accounting of fitness effects
is recorded in the first four rows of table 2.
(f ) Hamilton’s rule
Summing up all the weighted changes in fitness, i.e. the first
four rows of table 1 (or table 2), and recalling that vi and tij
are both equal to 1/2 for all i and j, produces the inclusive
fitness effect S of themutant belligerence (or bravery) allele.
Because we assumed no sex-specific dispersal, all prob-
abilities of identities between genes drawn from pairs of
adults are equal (Qf fZQfmZQmmZQ), and we use the
symbol Q to denote them. With this, the inclusive fitness
effect S depends only on two probabilities of identity, Qw
and Q (recall that QRmmZ ð1=NÞQwC ð1K1=NÞQ). We can
now separate all the changes in fitness appearing in S into
those factoring Qw (collectively called Kc) and those
factoring Q (collectively called b). We can, therefore, write
the inclusive fitness effect as SZKcQwCbQ, where Kc is
actually the average net effect of the behaviour of a focal
individual (averaged over male and female roles) on its own
fitness, and b can be thought of as the net effect of the
behaviour of the actor on the fitness of adult recipients,
summedupover all recipients in the focal individual’s patch.
The net fitness cost, c, and fitness benefit, b, for belligerence
and bravery are given in tables 1 and 2, respectively.
Selection favours a mutant allele when SO0, which can be
reorganized andwritten asRbKcO0, whereRZQw/Q is the
Table 1. Weighted changes in fitness for the belligerence allele.
changes in fitness weight
through sons KCa nmðtmmQwC tmfQfmÞ
Cað1KmÞ2ð1K2ausmð1K smÞÞ nm tmmQRmmC tmfQfm
! "
auBað1KmÞð1K smÞ nm tmmQRmmC tmfQfm
! "
through daughters auBað1KmÞð1K sf Þ nf tfmQRmmC tffQfm
! "
direct fitness cost cZ1=4½Cað1Kf1K2ausmð1K smÞgð1KmÞ2=NÞK2xuaBað1KmÞ=N$
indirect fitness benefit bZ1=4½2xuaBað1KmÞð2NK1Þ =NKCað1Kf1K2ausmð1K smÞgð1KmÞ2ð2NK1Þ=NÞ$
xh1KðsfC smÞ=2
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relatedness between two adult individuals (Hamilton 1971;
Michod & Hamilton 1980). The relatedness can also be
expressed as RZ2Q/(1CF ) (see equation (A 4)), where F
is the probability of identity between the maternally and
paternally inherited gene copies within an individual
(note that Q and F are equivalent to Wright’s (1951) FST
and FIT, respectively).
3. RESULTS
(a) Selection on male belligerence
Substituting c and b from table 1 into RbKcO0 and








where Ca/aBa is the ratio of the marginal cost to a male of
expressing belligerence to themarginal increase in the attack
probability (cost-to-benefit ratio), and xh1KðsfCsmÞ=2
(varying between 0 and 1) is the average increase in fitness
that a focal individual can gain through conquest. If one
considers that belligerence is an evolving continuous
phenotype z, then the marginal cost (Ca), the marginal
benefit (aBa) and the attack rate a could be modelled as
explicit functions of z (e.g. Frank 1998; Rousset 2004); and
equatingbothsidesof equation (3.1)allowsone, inprinciple,
to compute the values of z that are candidate evolutionary
stable strategies (Maynard-Smith 1982; Eshel 1983).
The invasion condition (equation (3.1)) highlights that
the direction of selection on a belligerence allele is an
increasing function of the relatedness coefficient between
adult individuals within groups, which is a dynamic
function of the parameters of the model (N, m, a, sm and
sf). In order to ascertain the direction of selection in the
absence of interactions between related individuals, which
are sometimes considered to be negligible in social groups
(Clutton-Brock 2002), one needs simply to set RZ0 in
equation (3.1). In this case, belligerence may invade, but it
is not altruistic (sensuHamilton (1964, 1970)) because the
trait spreads only if it results in a net direct fitness
increment, i.e. the belligerence allele spreads only ifKcO0.
Generally, correlated effects due to interactions between
relatives cannot be neglected when migration is limited
(unless population size is extremely large, in which case the
genetic variance between groups vanishes), which then
allows for the build up of relatedness (RO0), and eventually
the evolution of altruistic belligerence. We present the
equilibrium value of R as equation (A 9) of the appendix,
which allows us to compute the invasion condition explicitly
in terms of life-history features by inserting equation (A 9)
into equation (3.1). The resulting inequality is complicated,
but to the first order in 1/N (i.e. large group size), the
belligerence mutant invades the population, and goes to





N 1Kð1KmÞ2f1K2auxð1KxÞg! " : ð3:2Þ
The threshold cost-to-benefit ratio on the right-hand side
of this inequality, below which the mutant allele can invade,
is monotonically decreasing with group size (N ) and the
migration rate (m), and monotonically increasing with x.
That is, the selective pressure on themutant allele is stronger
when males and females from the conqueror groups are
more likely to populate the conquered group (e.g. higher
killing rateofmales,km,and females,k f, fromtheconquered
groups after conquest).
In figure 1, we plot the threshold cost-to-benefit ratio
(right-hand side of equation (3.2)) as a function of x for
various parameter values, and we see that when the
migration rate is relatively small (e.g. mZ0.1), belliger-
ence can be selected for even in groups of large size (e.g.
NZ50), whenever the returns from the war are sub-
stantial. In figure 2, we compare this threshold cost-
to-benefit ratio with the exact expression given by the
right-hand side of equation (3.1) with and without taking
relatedness into account, as a function of group size
N. Figure 2 shows that interactions between related
individuals substantially affect the selection pressure on
belligerence even in groups of large size, and that the
approximation to the threshold cost-to-benefit ratio given
by equation (3.2) remains good even for small group size.
(b) Selection on male bravery
Substituting c and b from table 2 into RbKcO0, we find







where Cu =uBu is the ratio of the marginal cost of
expressing bravery to the marginal increase in the
probability of winning a battle. Bravery could also be
modelled as an evolving phenotype z, in which case the
marginal cost (Ca), the marginal benefit (uBu) and the
probability of winning u could be complicated functions of
the phenotype z expressed by the individuals from the
attacker and attacked groups and their tactics. In this case,
care should be taken in evaluating uBu because this is
actually the average marginal increase in winning a battle,
namely the average over the marginal increase in the
probability of winning a battle when a focal group is
attacked (defence) and the marginal increase in the
probability of winning a battle when the focal group
attacks another group (offence). These effects may be
Table 2. Weighted changes in fitness for the bravery allele.
changes in fitness weight
through sons KaCu nmðtmmQwC tmfQfmÞ
aCuð1KmÞ2ð1K2usmð1K smÞÞ nm tmmQRmmC tmfQfm
! "
2auBuð1KmÞð1K smÞ nm tmmQRmmC tmfQfm
! "
through daughters 2auBuð1KmÞð1K sf Þ nf tfmQRmmC tffQfm
! "
direct fitness cost cZ1=4½aCuð1Kf1K2usmð1K smÞgð1KmÞ2=NÞKxauBuð1KmÞ=N$
indirect fitness benefit bZ1=4½4xauBuð1KmÞð2NK1Þ=NKaCuð1Kf1K2usmð1K smÞgð1KmÞ2ð2NK1Þ=NÞ$
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different but were assumed, here, to be the same. With
both belligerence and bravery being continuous pheno-
types, equations (3.1) and (3.3) could be used to compute
candidate coevolutionary stable strategies.
Inserting equation (A 9) into equation (3.3), and
keeping only the terms of leading order in 1/N (i.e. large






N 1Kð1KmÞ2f1K2auxð1KxÞg! " : ð3:4Þ
The only difference between the right-hand side of this
inequality and that of equation (3.2) is the factor 2 in
equation (3.4), which replaces u in the numerator of
equation (3.2). Hence, the selective pressure on bravery is
at least twice as strong as the selective pressure on
belligerence, but it behaves qualitatively in exactly the
same way. Therefore, bravery can also evolve in groups of
large size, and the doubling of the selective pressure stems
from bravery increasing the probability of winning a war
when the focal group is attacked (defence), as well as when
it attacks another group (offence).
5. DISCUSSION
We have provided a mathematical analysis of the selective
pressure on costly male belligerence and bravery when
these two traits are involved in tribalwar occurring between
small-scale, pre-state societies. We assumed that belliger-
ence increases an actor’s group’s probability of trying to
conquer another group, and that bravery increases the
actor’s group’s ability to conquer the attacked group.
It has been repeatedly stressed that warfare in hunter-
gatherer societies might be driven by the prospect of
obtaining reproduction-enhancing resources from other
groups (Durham 1976; Chagnon 1988; Turchin 2003;
Richerson &Boyd 2005). Our results suggest that two very
different types of reproduction-enhancing resources can
drive the evolution of male belligerence and bravery. First,
the two traits may evolve when only males from the
conqueror groups obtain additional mates through con-
quest (sfZ1, sm!0). In our model, this occurs when the
males from the conqueror groups replace those from the
conquered groups and then mate with conquered females.
Becausemales tend to be related within groups, this results
in both direct and indirect fitness benefits to males that
may offset their cost of expressing belligerence and bravery
(equations (3.1) and (3.3)). Second, when females from
the conqueror groups are likely to obtain more territories
to reproduce, male belligerence and bravery can also
evolve, even if the males obtain no fitness benefits by
conquest (smZ1, sf!0). In our model, this occurs when
females, who are likely to be related to the belligerent and
brave males of their group, replace the females of the
conquered group and subsequently produce offspring.
This results in an indirect selective pressure on male
belligerence and bravery, which again can offset the direct
cost of expressing these traits in males (equations (3.1) and
(3.3)). Although our formalization does not take into
account all types of reproduction-enhancing resources that
can be obtained by force (e.g. taking food, goods or slaves
to the deme of the conqueror group), it demonstrates that
male coalitional aggression can be an adaptation to the
conditions of limiting resources for both sexes.
Because relatedness decreases with increasing group size
(which decreases the coalescence rate within groups) and
migration rate (which homogenizes the genetic compo-
sition of populations), the selective pressure on genetically
























Figure 1. Threshold cost-to-benefit ratio for the mutant
belligerence allele to invade the population as given by the
right-hand side of equation (3.2) and graphed as a function of
the average fitness benefits x for various parameter values
(xh1KðsfC smÞ=2). We have aZ0.2 and uZ0.5 for all
curves, mZ0.1 and NZ25 for line a, mZ0.1 and NZ50 for


































Figure 2. Threshold cost-to-benefit ratio for the mutant
belligerence allele graphed as a function of group size N for
aZ0.2, uZ0.5, sfZ0.5 and smZ0.5, and two different values
for the migration rate: (a) mZ0.1 and (b) mZ0.25. Line a
(top lines) in (a) and (b) gives the right-hand side of equation
(3.1). Line b (nearly indistinguishable from line a) gives the
right-hand side of equation (3.2), which is the approximation
to the right-hand side of equation (3.1) for large group size,
but remains a good approximation even for small group size
(with increasing values of a, the approximation becomes less
accurate). Line c gives the right-hand side of equation (3.1)
with RZ0, i.e. by assuming that individuals within groups are
not genetically related. This assumption markedly reduces
the apparent selective pressure on belligerence.
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(equations (3.2) and (3.4)). This is a standard and general
result, which has been repeatedly documented in the
models considering the evolution of costly social behaviours
in subdivided populations (e.g. Eshel 1972; Aoki 1982;
Rogers 1990; van Baalen & Rand 1998; Taylor & Irwin
2000; Le Galliard et al. 2003; Gardner & West 2006;
Lehmann et al. 2006; Lion & Van Baalen 2007). Despite
the decrease in relatedness with larger population size, our
results suggest that the selective pressure on male
belligerence and especially male bravery can remain
substantial even in groups of large size. For instance, with
a migration probability of mZ0.1, costly male bravery may
evolve even when the numberN of individuals of each sex in
a group is as large as 50 (equations (3.2) and (3.4);
figure 2), a figure that is larger than that is usually
considered in the models for the evolution of costly social
behaviours in subdivided populations.
This strong selective pressure can be explained by
invoking two assumptions of our model. First, we assumed
paternal control of the phenotypes of pre-adult males
(which is plausible because group-level decisions tend to
be made by the individuals from older age classes in human
societies). Because a parent is less related to its offspring
than the offspring is related to itself, a parent is more willing
to ‘sacrifice’ an offspring than an offspring is willing to
sacrifice itself when it is in control of its ownphenotype. The
selective pressure on male bravery is thus expected to
decrease under offspring control, and could, theoretically,
be halved. Nevertheless, it would still remain significant in
groups of large size. The second important factor is that an
actor expressing bravery has a dual effect on its group’s
members’ fitness: on the one hand, bravery increases the
actor’s group’s probability to resist group extinction
(defence), and on the other hand it increases the probability
that the actor’s group conquers another group (offence),
where these two effects do not directly increase the intensity
of competition between the members of the actor’s group.
This situation is very different from that where the actor’s
behaviour augments the fertility of groupmembers and thus
produces higher local competitionbetweengroupmembers,
which, in turn, feeds back negatively on the evolution of the
trait (Taylor 1992; Taylor & Irwin 2000; West et al. 2008).
Because behavioural effects translate into a fitness benefit to
all group members and no increase in competition between
them, our life history easily promotes the evolution of costly
social traits. Our formalization is, therefore, closely related
to previous analytical models for the evolution of social
behaviour, in which the actor’s behaviour reduces the
probability of environmental group extinction (Eshel 1972;
Aoki 1982; Lehmann et al. 2006), the so-called selective
extinction models, and those where whole groups compete
against each other (Gardner & West 2006; Lehmann et al.
2006); the so-called budding or propagule dispersalmodels.
Our model is also closely related to the simulations of
Choi & Bowles (2007) for the coevolution of helping and
parochiality when warfare occurs between groups. In the
setting used by these authors, interactions occur in each
time period between randomly paired groups. The
probability that war occurs between a pair of groups
depends on the frequency of parochial individuals within
groups (which can be thought of as belligerence in our
model). The winning group, the one with the largest
number of helpers (which can be thought of as bravery in
our model), then has a higher chance to repopulate vacant
breeding spots due to casualties in both combatant groups.
Choi & Bowles (2007) carried out simulations withNZ26
(haploid individuals) and mZ0.25 and found that
parochiality and helping might evolve, a result that is
corroborated by our analytical model. However, in their
discussion on the factors generating assortment between
identical strategies, they suggest that kin selection is not
important for their results. Our analytical formulation
allows comparison of the intensity of selection with and
without the effects of relatedness and how these depend on
group size andmigration rate. Hence, one can evaluate the
level of belligerence and bravery that would evolve without
relatedness, by direct effects on fitness alone (figure 2).
Our results suggest that relatedness between group
members plays a crucial role in accounting for the
evolution of male belligerence and bravery. This is
particularly the case when only females benefit from
additional enhancing resources (smZ1, sf!0), and where
the fitness benefits generating the selection pressure on
both traits can accrue tomales only indirectly. Our analysis
thus reinforces Hamilton’s (1975) conjecture that related-
ness within groups can result in the development of within-
group coalition and between-group hostility.
Although we assumed genetic inheritance of belliger-
ence and bravery, these behaviours may also be inherited
culturally (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman 1981; Boyd &
Richerson 1985), and our main results (equations (3.1)
and (3.3)) apply to cultural transmission under specific
conditions. If individuals express one of two cultural
variants segregating in the population that directly affect
reproduction (i.e. effects on Darwinian fitness; Cavalli-
Sforza & Feldman 1981), and their transmission is
unbiased, first vertically from parents to offspring and
then horizontally or obliquely before or after the dispersal
stage, then our invasion conditions also apply to culturally
determined belligerence and bravery. In this case, QwZ1
and Qij represent the probabilities of identity between the
cultural variants carried by two individuals, one of sex i
and the other of sex j, which may, in principle, remain
positive in groups of any size (Lehmann et al. 2008).
Consequently, under cultural transmission, male belliger-
ence and bravery may evolve in large-scale societies.
In summary, our model has yielded two results. First, it
has clarified the connection between relatedness,
migration rate and population size for the evolution of
male belligerence and bravery, and showed that genetically
determined within-group coalition and between-group
hostility may evolve in groups of large size (Nw50 of each
sex), but cultural transmission of these traits may allow for
their evolution in groups of any size. Second, we identified
two independent types of reproduction-enhancing
resources for males and females, which can drive
intergroup conflict and should be taken into account
when trying to understand its evolution. This is pertinent
for understanding the possible benefits that allowed
evolution of male coalitional strategies such as hunter-
gatherers raiding neighbouring groups and capturing
material resources and women by force (Chagnon 1988).
We thank M. Cant for pointing us to the work of J. Fearon,
and J. Fearon himself for a helpful discussion. We thank
S. West for comments on a previous version of this paper, and
all the referees for their helpful suggestions. L.L. is supported
by a grant from the Swiss NSF. This research is supported in
part by NIH grant GM28016 to M.W.F.
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APPENDIX A: PROBABILITIES OF IDENTITY BY DESCENT AND RELATEDNESS
Here, we compute the probabilities of identity between pairs of homologous genes randomly sampled within (Qw) and
between (Qi j) adult individuals by standard methods (e.g. Karlin 1968; Taylor 1988a; Gandon 1999; Gillespie 2004;
Rousset 2004). We evaluate these probabilities at equilibrium, neglecting time indices, and start by evaluating the
probabilities of identity just after reproduction (stage 1 of the life cycle), i.e. at the juvenile stage.
By our assumption that individuals are diploid, the probabilities of identity between any pair of juveniles are the same,
irrespective of their sexes. The probability of identity Q J between two genes randomly sampled in two distinct juveniles
can be decomposed as
Q JZ ð1KauÞQ JncCauQ Jc; ðA 1Þ
where Q Jnc is the probability of identity between two homologous genes sampled in two distinct juveniles in a non-
conquered group, while Q Jc stands for the same probability in a conquered group. We express these two probabilities as
functions of the identities within and between adults after dispersal and density-dependent competition (Qw and Qij) by
noting that with probability 1/4 the two genes are both of maternal and paternal origin, with 1/2 one gene is of maternal
origin and the other is of paternal origin and with 1/Ni two randomly sampled juveniles descend from the same parent of



























In a conquered group, a pair of adults share genes identical by descent after density-dependent competition only if this

































because with probability 1/2 the two genes under scrutiny are replicas of the same gene of an individual and are thus
identical, while with probability 1/2 one gene is a replica of the maternally inherited gene and the other is a replica of the
paternally inherited gene, in which case their probability of identity is F, which is the average inbreeding coefficient in an
adult individual (i.e. probability of identity between the maternally and paternally inherited gene copies within an
individual). At equilibrium, F in an adult individual is the same as the inbreeding coefficient within a juvenile of the next
generation, which is equal to the average genetic identity between the parents of that juvenile, namely
FZ ð1KauÞQfmCaufð1K smÞð1K sf ÞC smsf gQfm: ðA 5Þ
When the dispersal rate is the same in each sex, the probabilities of identity between two genes sampled in two different
adults will be the same, irrespective of the sexes of these individuals (Qf fZQfmZQmm). These probabilities are then
related to Q J, according to the equation
Qij Z ð1KmÞ2Q J; ðA 6Þ
which, on substitution into equations (A 2)–(A 5), allows us to solve equations (A 1) and (A 5) for F and Q J explicitly
FZ




4NKð1KmÞ2 ð4NK1ÞKau ð4NK1ÞðsfC smÞK2ðNK1Þ sfC sm




4NKð1KmÞ2 ð4NK1ÞKau ð4NK1ÞðsfC smÞK2ðNK1Þ sfC sm
! "2K6sf sm' (h i : ðA 8Þ
Under neutrality, the relatedness R between two individuals is given by the ratio of Q relative to Qw (Hamilton 1971;
Michod & Hamilton 1980). Using equation (A 4), this produces RZ2Q/(1CF ), whose explicit solution can be obtained
using equations (A 6)–(A 8), which yields
RZ
1
2NKð1KmÞ2 ð2NK1ÞKau ð2NK1ÞðsfC smÞKNðsfC smÞ2C s2f C s2m
! ") * : ðA 9Þ
When aZ0, all the above equations (equations (A 5)–(A 9)) reduce to the standard formulae (e.g. Taylor 1988a;
Gandon 1999).
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Correction
Corrigendum for the paper ‘War and the evolution of belligerence and bravery’
Laurent Lehmann and Marcus W. Feldmann
Proc. R. Soc. B 275, 2877–2885 (22 December 2008; Published online 26 August 2008) (doi:10.1098/rspb.
2008.0842)
In the paper ‘War and the evolution of belligerence and bravery’ (Lehmann & Feldman, 2008, which we will refer to as
L&F), we used probabilities of identity by descent between pairs of homologous genes sampled in sub-adult individuals
after migration (individuals sampled before stage (4) of the life cycle described on p. 2878 of L&F) in order to compute
the invasion conditions of male belligerence and bravery. However, the formulation of the model requires that we should
have used instead the probabilities of identity by descent between pairs of genes sampled in adult individuals (individuals
sampled after stages (4) and (5) of the life cycle). In this corrigendum, we present the probabilities of identity by descent
between adults and the corresponding corrected invasion conditions for belligerence and bravery.
1. PROBABILITIES OF IDENTITY BY DESCENT
In order to evaluate selection on belligerence and bravery, we used eqn (A 6) of our appendix (Qij ¼ (1 2 m)2QJ), which
is the probability of identity by descent between pairs of genes randomly sampled in two distinct sub-adult individuals
(individuals sampled before stage (4) of the life cycle), one gene from an individual of sex i and the other from an indi-
vidual of sex j, and where QJ is the probability of identity between a pair of juveniles (individuals sampled after stage (1)
of the life cycle).
However, Qij needs to be the average probability of identity by descent between pairs of homologous genes randomly
sampled in two distinct adult individuals of sex i and sex j (individuals sampled after stages (4) and (5) of the life cycle),
which is given by
Qij ¼ ð1# avÞ þ av ð1# siÞð1# sjÞ þ sisj
! "# $ð1#mÞ2Q J; ð1:1Þ
where the term in brackets is the effect of regulation (stage (4) of the life cycle) on the probabilities of identity, which was
not accounted for in eqn (A 6) of L&F.
Equation (1.1) can be understood as follows. With probability 12 av, the group where the two adults are sampled
has not been conquered, in which case the probability of identity between the two individuals is (1 2 m)2Q J. With prob-
ability av, this group has been conquered in which case the two adults descend from the same group before regulation
with probability (1 2 si) (1 2 sj) þ sisj (with probability (1 2 si)(1 2 sj) from the conqueror group and with probability sisj
from the conquered group) and their probability of identity is then equal to that among sub-adults (1 2 m)2Q J.
Although we misinterpreted Qij, the equilibrium expression for Q
J (eqn (A 8) of L&F) was computed correctly
because we took into account all events affecting the dynamics of Q J over one iteration of the life cycle. Similarly,
the inbreeding coefficient in adults F (eqn (A 7) of L&F) was also computed correctly as it is not affected by regulation.
On substituting eqn (A 8) of L&F into equation (1.1), we obtain the equilibrium value for the probability of identity
between two distinct adult individuals of sex i and j as
Qij ¼ ð1# avÞ þ avfð1# siÞð1# sjÞ þ sisjg
# $ð1#mÞ2
4N # ð1#mÞ2 ð4N # 1Þ # av ð4N # 1Þðsf þ smÞ # 2ðN # 1Þðsf þ smÞ2 # 6sf sm
% &h i : ð1:2Þ
When the sexes have the same survival probability during regulation (sm ¼ sf ¼ s), equation (1.2) reduces to
Qij ¼ Q ¼ f1# 2avsð1# sÞgð1#mÞ
2
4N # ð1#mÞ2ð4N # 1Þf1# 2avsð1# sÞg ; ð1:3Þ
which then gives relatedness R ¼ 2Q/(1 þ F) (L&F, p. 2881), after inserting eqn (A 7) of L&F, as
R ¼ f1# 2avsð1# sÞgð1#mÞ
2
2N # ð1#mÞ2ð2N # 1Þf1# 2avsð1# sÞg : ð1:4Þ
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The main consequence of using equation (1.1) instead of eqn (A 6) of the appendix of L&F is that Qij is actually sex-
specific, as can be seen from the numerator of equation (1.2). It follows that, first, eqns (3.1) and (3.3) of L&F are valid
only when the sexes have the same survival probability during regulation (sm ¼ sf ¼ s) with relatedness given by equation
(1.4) instead of the incorrect eqn (A 9) of L&F, and, second, that eqns (3.2) and (3.4) have to be recalculated from
tables 1 and 2, respectively, by using equation (1.2). The new invasion conditions are presented in the next section.
2. SELECTION ON MALE BELLIGERENCE
In the absence of sex-specific survival during regulation (sm ¼ sf ¼ s) and substituting equation (1.4) into eqn (3.1) of





Nð1" ð1"mÞ2f1" 2avsð1" sÞgÞ ; ð2:1Þ
which holds for any population size. Corresponding invasion conditions for general N were omitted from L&F because
the corresponding expressions evaluated with the probabilities of identity between sub-adults were too complicated.
Instead, we presented only invasion conditions that assumed large N in the presence of sex-specific survival during regu-
lation (sm= sf) and where we omitted to take the factor in brackets in equation (1.1) into account.
In order to obtain the correct invasion condition for male belligerence under sex-specific survival, we substitute
equation (1.2) into table 1 of L&F, and after summing up all the weighted changes in fitness, we find that selection




2vxð1"mÞf1þ avð1"mÞ2ðsf " smÞð1" sf " smÞ=2g
N 1" ð1"mÞ2f1" 2avxð1" xÞg
! " ; ð2:2Þ
where x ¼ 12 (sf þ sm)/2 as defined on p. 2881 of L&F. The only difference between this equation and eqn (3.2) of L&F
is the term in the curly braces in the numerator, which makes the right-hand side somewhat smaller than in eqn (3.2) for
otherwise similar parameter values, but this difference is very small for the parameter values given in the numerical
results presented in figs 1 and 2 of L&F. But no qualitative differences are observed; that is, the right-hand sides of
both equation (2.2) here and eqn (3.2) of L&F are positive or equal to zero for all combinations of parameter values.
3. SELECTION ON MALE BRAVERY
In the absence of sex-specific survival during regulation (sm ¼ sf ¼ s), and substituting equation (1.4) into eqn (3.3) of





N 1" ð1"mÞ2f1" 2avsð1" sÞg
! " ; ð3:1Þ
which holds for any population size. Again, no such result for general N was presented L&F, where we presented only
the invasion condition assuming large N in the presence of sex-specific survival but with the probabilities of identity that
omitted the factor in brackets in equation (1.1).
In order to obtain the correct invasion condition for male bravery in the presence of sex-specific survival during regu-
lation, we substitute equation (1.2) into table 2 and after summing all the weighted changes in fitness, we find that




4xð1"mÞf1þ avð1"mÞ2ðsf " smÞð1" sf " smÞ=2g
N 1" ð1"mÞ2f1" 2avxð1" xÞg
! " : ð3:2Þ
The difference between this equation and eqn (3.4) of L&F is the same term in the numerator that distinguishes
equation (2.1) above from eqn (3.2) of L&F.
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